The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA) introduced significant changes to financial practice and corporate governance regulation, including stringent new rules designed to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. Briefly speaking, it requires management to submit a report containing an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure, a description of material weaknesses in such internal controls and of any material noncompliance. Such mandatory regulations can have some broader ramifications on firm profitability, market structure and social welfare, many of which were unintended when policy makers first formulated this Act. Moreover, the tight coupling between compliance activities, information disclosure and IT investments can have implications for IT governance because of its potential to change relationships between technology investments and business. This article aims to provide some intuitive insights into the trade-offs involved for firms in disclosure of such information, and gives an overview of some research questions that would be of interest to academics, industry executives and policy makers alike.
Introduction
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act was formulated to increase companies' compliance with SEC disclosure laws. In the aftermath of Enron, World Com, Tyco and other high-profile business scandals between December 2001 and June 2002, Congress rapidly approved the passage of the SOX Act (SOA). What prompted the government to create this provision was a concern stemming from the lack of sufficient controls at these scandal-ridden firms, and the need for firms' financial statements to be accurate and devoid of any kind of accounting manipulation. Thus, the SOX Act required managers to implement controls over the financial reporting process and state whether they were effective.
In particular, the SOX Act introduced significant changes to financial practice and corporate governance regulation, including stringent new rules designed to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws. Perhaps the part of the Act having the most impact was Section 404. Section 404 requires management to submit to the SEC with the company's annually filed financial statements, an internal control report, which shall state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. It should also contain an assessment, as of the end of the fiscal year, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. It also requires auditors to attest to, and report on the management's assessment of the internal control systems. Such reports should include a description of material weaknesses in such internal controls and of any material noncompliance. Furthermore, where significant deficiencies exist, they need to be identified as required under SOX. For an interesting study that examined the cause of significant deficiencies in internal control that required identification, see Ge and McVay (2005) . They found that poor internal control is related to "an insufficient commitment of resources for accounting controls". An example of a statement contained within the internal control report provided by corporations is provided below.
• An evaluation of the effectiveness ….disclosure controls and procedures…was performed… ..with the participation of the Company's Management, … these …are effective to provide reasonable assurance that information required to be disclosed by the Company ..is accumulated and communicated to the Company's Management …to allow timely decisions regarding required disclosure and …to provide reasonable assurance that such information is recorded, processed, summarized and reported within the time periods. 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc-March 31, 2005 2
Since modern financial reporting systems are heavily dependant on technology and associated 2 This example was taken from the study by Gordon et al. (2006) . controls, any review of internal controls would not be complete without addressing controls around information security. An insecure system would not be considered a source of reliable financial information because of the possibility of unauthorized transactions or data manipulation, each of which can compromise data integrity. The SOX Act focuses on management accountability and operating efficiencies in firms. Both of these are tightly coupled with investments in IT and the role played by IT professionals. Indeed, sections 302 and 404 indirectly force the scrutiny of information security controls for SOX compliance. 3 The implication of these new regulations is that organizations, especially those dealing with financial information, must establish the appropriate processes and technologies to evaluate data usage requirements for all users and create a data usage control policy that defines how data may be used by each user. They need to record database activity and report on deviations from the data usage control policy. Further, they need to alert management when a deviation from usage control policy might violate data integrity.
There's been a lot of debate about the impact of new government and industry regulations on IT departments, especially in the financial services sector. The financial services sector has long been presumed to practice superior information security, largely because of the preciousness of its assets and the fact that its business is carried out almost entirely on IT systems. A study based on interviews with 100 IT managers in UK financial services companies reveals that given the current level of investment in technologies that help companies comply with regulations such as SOX, around 60% of IT managers from financial services companies believe the demand on IT to deal with compliance issues will increase over the coming three years (Carr 2006 ). Indeed, the study states that most respondents are not satisfied with their current capabilities to perform tasks necessary for compliance such as document management and archiving. Further, it also reports that "most financial companies are only just beginning to scratch the surface in areas such as the archiving of electronic messages and digitized phone records." This becomes even more important in the face of a recent study that shows how susceptible the financial services industry is to targeted scans and probing attacks (Schneier 2005 CEOs to certify the accuracy of financial statements.
In addition to the direct cost of implementing a system that achieves compliance with SOX, the workload and risk of directors has increased as a result of the regulation. This, in turn, has lead to an increase in the fees paid to directors. Further, the increase is disproportionately high on small firms. To be fair, SOX Act can have a number of expected benefits. First, it could lead to greater accountability, ownership and appreciation of internal control systems throughout all levels of an organization. Second, it can lead to more timely identification and remediation of internal control weaknesses that might not have been detected otherwise. Thus, the benefits of improved corporate controls are expected to be found not only in decreased malfeasance, but perhaps even more so in a substantial increase in corporate data quality, the decrease of instances of erroneous intra-and extracorporate transactions.
The above information then highlights that there are distinct trade-offs involved in such mandatory accounting information disclosure regulations. This paves the way for a set of research questions which might of interest to academics and executives alike. Some of these are outlined below.
Research Questions

1.
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements are causing companies to reconsider public status. Is that detrimental for social welfare?
The SOX Act was designed to restore investor confidence and prevent the type of corporate malfeasance that has plagued the U.S. capital markets in recent years. While few would argue with the assertion that the SOX regulations have increased corporate transparency and enhanced corporate governance, it has become increasingly clear that these improvements are creating a disproportionately heavy burden on small public companies. The costs of complying with the SOX Act, however, are borne by all public companies. Thus, it seems to have a major negative impact as well: namely reduction in companies going public with their IPOs and increase in acquisitions. Indeed in 2005, 33% of the 18 withdrawn stock offerings -including IPOs, secondary offerings and convertible-stock deals -were put on hold because the issuers began discussions to be acquired instead (Dealogic 2005). That has increased from 2004, when 18% of the 97 withdrawn deals were due to acquisition discussions, and 2003, when 16% of 67 deals were pulled for that reason. Thus, the backlash from the legislative penalty may be worse than the crime it was intended to prevent. One explanation for the exodus from the public market and increase in acquisitions is to avoid the burden of complying with the SOX Act regulations. The added time, expense and managerial hassle to small companies may be tipping the decision away from a public offering. 4 In a number of press releases announcing the decision to deregister a firm's stock, managers typically cite the high costs of reporting as the key motivation for "going dark" as it is quite commonly known. These trends demonstrate that the SOX Act may even be altering the operation of capital markets.
This may not only affect US firms directly but may also have an impact on the number of foreign investors in US markets. In fact, given these mandatory regulations, many foreign firms may not be willing to enter or stay in the US markets (HRO Alert 2005). Even with the SEC's partial exemption of the compliance requirements of foreign companies, some of them may stay away from US markets because of the tougher accounting rules and heightened emphasis on corporate governance. Thus, the SOX Act throws up interesting implications of this act on the net social welfare generated not just from product markets but also from the interactions with capital markets. Does a decreases in participation in public markets, or an increase in the number of acquisitions adversely affect welfare?
What are the plausible outcomes? The jury is still out on these questions.
2.
By creating an artificial incentive for firms to merge, is the law impeding market competition?
According to several CEOs, the SOX Act does stifle intra-industry competition. According to the 4 One could also argue that SOX could have a negative influence on corporate mergers and acquisitions because acquiring firms may be wary of the financial liability they could assume for the private companies they acquire. Anecdotal or empirical evidence to support this assertion is little or non-existent, though.
AeA, the largest trade association for the high-technology sector, Section 404 has become problematic because the cost burden amounts to a major regressive tax on small business, given that the cost is not directly proportionate to revenue (AeA 2005). For multi-billion dollar companies, the cost may run at approximately 0.05 percent of revenue, but for small companies with revenues below $20 million, the costs can rapidly approach three percent of revenue. At the micro level, anecdotal evidence reveals that for a large company the cost of Section 404 is approximately $400 per employee, whereas, for small companies, the cost in many instances approaches $4,000 per employee. However, external auditors have generally adopted a "one size fits all" approach to Section 404. This means that a small company (in terms of revenue) and a relatively simple organizational structure essentially is being held to the same standard as a large multi-billion dollar company with a very complicated organizational structure. The SEC believed there would be "a direct correlation between the extent of the burden and the size of the reporting company, with the burden increasing commensurate with the size of the company." But the opposite appears to be true.
While the federal government acknowledges the ways in which SOX raises the costs of doing business, they also feel these costs are more than offset by the benefits of improved accounting CEOs and boards of directors now care, more than ever, about software and systems that will help them comply with SOX. Specifically, the tenets of SOX Act specify that corporate governance be responsible for providing transparency, integrity, and accountability over regulated financial data. As with most laws of this type, regulatory compliance only establishes a base line and is just a start to ethical corporate governance and financial conduct. Also, given the high stakes involved firms are also considering outsourcing some of the software systems development to companies that already have the expertise in secure coding techniques. In addition, firms could in principle, also explore the role that application security products could play in reducing time to be compliant. It has been reported in the media that SOX regulations create fear among management that they are exposing themselves to second-guessing when making business decisions, raising the hurdle for businesses to make investments. And raising the hurdle rates implies that "some investments that should have been undertaken, that would have been good for society, good for investors, good for shareholders, and good for the economy's growth, won't be undertaken." 5 Moreover, many companies are delaying the implementation of significant IT projects by six to nine months solely because of the documentation and testing requirements of Section 404. Many firms also expect this problem to persist, and predict that they will be able to make major systems changes only in the first half of their fiscal years going forward. As a result, Section 404 requirements seem to be significantly 5 A Sense of Siege. MSNBC (January 7, 2005) inhibiting business operations and having an impact on the competitiveness of companies.
4.
How does compliance affect the security of critical infrastructure assets?
Certain industries are very critical to our nationwide security because of their intimate connection to critical infrastructure assets. According to the DHS (Department of Homeland Security), critical infrastructure includes "cyber assets both technology-based, physical and logical which are so vital that their infiltration, incapacitation, destruction or misuse would have a debilitating impact on the health, safety, welfare or economic of US citizens." The financial services industry, which is privy to the sensitive information about consumers is also most susceptible to cyber-security breaches. Given Related to this is the question of "externalities" which arise when cost and benefits of investments are harder to quantify. This is certainly true of information security investments. For example, while a significant terrorist attack undermines the nation's sovereignty, the costs associated with such an attack may be difficult to quantify. In economics, such an attack is defined as imposing a "negative externality." The presence of this negative externality means that private markets will under investment in security than the socially optimal level. This is because firms deciding how best to protect themselves against terrorism are unlikely to take the external costs of an attack fully into account, and therefore will generally provide an inefficiently low level of security against terrorism on their own (Orzag 2003) . Without government involvement, private markets will thus typically underinvest in anti-terrorism measure. In such contexts information sharing may act as a panacea; Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) find that security technology investments and security information sharing act as "strategic complements" in equilibrium. On the other hand, information sharing can also lead to a free-riding problem (Gordon, Loeb and Lucyshyn 2003).
5.
How does mandatory information disclosure affect a firm's intellectual property?
SOX can have a major impact on the importance and management of intangible assets such as intellectual property (IP). In fact, among SOX's accounting mandates are specific requirements on companies to report on the value of their IP and to annually audit their IP. Given the intricate interplay between intellectual property and SOX, companies are beginning to appreciate the role of intellectual property in financial performance. Under SOX, firms need to be diligent in disclosing and certifying their tangible and intangible assets in all financial reports. They must identify and list their important IP assets, value them, link those assets to the financial performance and operation of the company, and disclose any impairment to them (Foley and Lardner 2005) . IP assets are to be audited annually to determine if there has been any impairment or loss that needs to be accounted for. Patent and trademark portfolios, for example, need to be decomposed and allocated to associated cost and revenue streams. This implies tracking changes in the legal landscape, such as potential claims of intellectual property infringement, changes in competitor intellectual property portfolios, amendments to the scope of patent or trademark applications or patent and trademark validity challenges, and changes in intellectual property law (Blair 2005 ).
Given these scenarios, measurements undertaken to safeguard IP are part of the controls that must be certified by a company under SOX regulations. In many firms, this is bringing forth a need to formalize and update their IP management processes to better track the IP along with other assets.
Rather than having the legal team bear sole responsibility, multidisciplinary teams are being created to review and assess the company's IP-related contracts, including non-disclosure, employment and licensing agreements. 
Economic Modeling of the Problem
Several of these questions are inherently empirical in nature. And some of these empirical studies can be complemented by looking at specific case-studies. On the other hand, analytical models can also be built towards providing many interesting and intuitive insights into these issues. How can one model these phenomena and answer the above questions? It is probably too ambitious to hope that a single Each firm has a resource constraint C, where C is some function of investments in productivity or innovation, I and the investments in SOX compliance X: ( ) = , C f I X . So one trade off the firms face is that if I increases, X will have to decrease and vice versa. However, an increase in X also reduces the cost of capital, which in turn can facilitate increased investments in I. So there are two countervailing effects of the increase in X on I. Additionally, one would need to model a trade off between investments in capital markets and product markets (Evans and Sridhar 2002) . Further, it might be important to incorporate a parameter which models the "maturity" of the industry. For instance, the impact of SOX on the bio-tech industry will probably be different than that from a more mature industry such as oil & gas. This parameter will map whether the industry is more prone to IPOs, start-ups, and whether it is more susceptible to acquisitions & mergers.
Conclusion
In hopes of restoring investor's faith in corporate America, SOX established significant changes in both management's reporting responsibilities. An unanimous consensus is that regulations such as the SOX, California SB 1386, and the GLB amongst others, are having an enormous impact on organizations. To meet the aggressive deadlines of these regulations, firms in several industries, including financial services, have invested significantly in consulting, auditors, and new business processes to foster disclosure of material weakness and ensure internal control. A number of recent studies have shown that SOX compliance comes with a high price tag. Companies face both direct (quantifiable) and indirect (non-quantifiable) costs such as increased D&O insurance premiums, higher directors fees as a result of greater time commitments and responsibilities, larger expenses related to internal control software and higher costs relating to consulting fees. An important aspect of these costs is that they are not proportional to the size of the organization. Consequently, smaller firms are being more adversely affected than larger firms.
There is no question that SOX is having a big impact on IT governance. While corporate executives agree that restoring investor confidence is in the best interest of the economy, they disagree on the actual cost and benefits of SOX compliance. The regulations accruing from the SOX Act have forced companies to undertake a series of dramatic changes in the way they appropriate resources to key activities such as IT security. In many firms, critical resources are being diverted away from regular projects to expedite compliance, and several business units are reeling from its impact. Moreover, critics argue that although SOX has raised the level of disclosure, the readjustment of costs affects a company's global competitiveness (Lowengrub 2005) . If firms end up passing their compliance costs onto customers by increasing prices, it will make them less competitive in the marketplace, especially with respect to foreign firms that are not subject to SOX. Furthermore, it is plausible that restraints from internal controls reduce the flexibility to respond to customer concerns. Moreover, the tight coupling between compliance activities, information disclosure and IT security, can have implications for IT governance because of its potential to change relationships between technology investments and business. Thus, such mandatory regulations can have some broader ramifications on firm profitability, market structure and social welfare, many of which were unintended when policy makers first formulated this Act.
The aim of this article is not to criticize such regulations. Rather, this article aims to provide some intuitive insights into the trade offs involved for firms and lays the ground for some research questions that would be of interest to academics, industry executives and policy makers alike. It would be interesting to address some of these questions in future research, and we hope that it also spurs some more new exciting research along the way.
